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Free Appropriate Public Education Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
Requirements, Issues and Suggestions
l.

INTRODUCTION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
widely known as P.L. 94-142 or the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), is a federal statute designed to support
efforts of state and local agencies to educate children with
disabilities. One of IDEA's stated purposes is assuring the
availability of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to all
children with disabilities. 1 This free appropriate education is
to (1) be provided at public expense, (2) meet State standards,
(3) range from preschool through secondary school, and (4)
conform with Individualized Education Programs (IEPs). 2 The
question of whether or not FAPE is provided is the source of
considerable litigation, particularly over the cost of services.
The interests of parents and agencies may be best met if parents and educational agencies appreciate the other's interests
and constraints and then proceed as partners rather than as
adversaries.
II.DETERMINING IF

F APE IS PROVIDED

The Supreme Court took occasion to offer, in Hudson v.
Rowley, 3 extensive practical interpretation of IDEA. Amy
Rowley was a deaf elementary school student who, despite her
disability, was an excellent lip reader. Initially the school provided a sign-language interpreter, but when the interpreter

1. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c).
2. The term "free appropriate public education" means special education
and related services that(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program.
20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(18).
3. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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reported that Amy did not need him, the school stopped the
services. Subsequent requests by the Rowleys for an interpreter
were denied, and suit was brought. The lower courts held in
favor of the Rowleys, comparing the potential of children with
disabilities and those without disabilities. The discrepancy of
potential was to be made up by the school. Weighing Amy's
potential against the school's responsibility, the Supreme Court
found that Amy understood less than her classmates and that
her achievement would no doubt accelerate if she understood
more. However, as she was performing better than average in
her classes and advancing easily from grade to grade, the
school was not required to maximize her potential, but simply
to provide an educational benefit.
Acknowledging the broad spectrum of disabilities, the
Court declined to create any set of educational adequacy criteria, but instead prescribed a flexible two-part query: (1) has the
State complied with the procedures of IDEA, and (2) is the IEP
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits. 4 This test has important ramifications. First, it suggests that agencies need only provide appropriate opportunities
in light of the child's disabilities 5 , as opposed to ensuring that
some fixed standard of educational achievement is met. Secondly, a detailed analysis of IDEA prompted the Court to conclude
(over powerful dissents), that the Act's language "to the maxi-

4. ld. at 206, 208. The Court cited 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2) which authorizes
trial courts to review the administrative proceedings and additional evidence and
base decisions on the preponderance of the evidence. The Court held that de novo
review was slightly too strong, and that "once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by
the States."
5.
Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition
also requires that such instruction and services be provided at public
expense . . . meet the State's standards, approximate the grade levels
used in the State's regular education, and comport with the child's
IEP. Thus if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient
supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction,
and other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is
receiving a "free appropriate public education" as defined by the
Act . . . .
Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children. Certainly the language of the statute contains no
requirement like the one imposed by the lower courts-that States
maximize the potential of handicapped children "commensurate with
the opportunity provided to other children."
ld. at 189.
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mum extent appropriate"6 does not require the desirable goal
of maximizing a child's potential, but rather to provide maximum access to a public education. 7 In effect, IDEA is to be
viewed as a law of process, and not one of outcome.
The decision of the Court reflects a philosophical change
from the contemporary perception of educational agencies. Most
public schools today operate under an industrial factory mentality.8 Schools are intended to move all students through the
system at the same rate, culminating with a standardized
"graduate." A major flaw in this production theory, as applied
to public schools, is that schools cannot exercise quality control
on the raw materials (students) they are provided. Variations
in students and graduates are therefore to be expected, and
likewise, the same educational process can not be expected to
be successful with each student. Individualization of both process and expectation is warranted. In this analysis, student
failure is presumably the fault of an inappropriately individualized process. 9
Intuitively, the individualization of student educational
processes has positive aspects. However, in the case of children
with disabilities, compliance with Rowley requires more than
good intentions.

A. Procedural Compliance
The first prong of the Rowley appropriateness test is compliance with procedural requirements. James Jackson, upon
release from the East Mississippi State Hospital, where he had
6. § 1412(5).
7.
Desirable though that goal [maximizing the potential of children with
disabilities] might be, it is not the standard that Congress imposed
upon States . . . Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and
evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a
free public education.
Id. at 200.
8. See DONNA K. CRAWFORD, THE ScHOOL FOR QUALITY LEARNING: MANAGING THE ScHOOL AND CLASSROOM THE DEMING WAY (1993).
9. Accepting a management theory of education would require significant
changes in premises central to the common (public) schools in the United States.
The significance of letter grades (which generally reflect only performance in comparison to other students), credit earned on the basis of time in class (and not in
relation to any accomplishment or competency), and the notion that children can
only receive public education from five to eighteen (not drop out until 16, nor come
back after 18) are examples of historical ideas which might need to be sacrificed
before a management approach could be implemented in schools.
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been evaluated and treated after accosting several classmates,
was denied re-entry to his school. 10 James was sixteen when
the suit was filed and had been attending special education
classes in the school system for five years. The school claimed
that James' presence at school would have threatened his and
other student's safety. The court, however, held that the exclusion from school was a change in James' educational placement
and program, and since it had occurred without prior notice or
hearing, it was a per se violation of the Act's procedural requirements. The clear message of this case and others is that
failure to meet the procedural requirements of IDEA constitutes F APE violation.
A case decided after the IDEA's effective date, W.G. v.
Target, 11 again affirms the importance of procedural requirements. Here a school district convened an IEP meeting without
the participation of the student, the parent, the student's
teacher, or any representative of the school attended by the
student, as required by IDEA. 12 As such, the court found that
the student was effectively denied a F APE.
In Doe v. Defendant 113 however, an IEP which was deficient in several of the same areas as W. G. was upheld. In this
case, although previously classified as learning disabled, when
John Doe entered junior high school, his father requested that
John be left without special education or assessment to see how
well he adjusted to school. As a result, IEP specified neither
what special services were necessary, nor John's current levels
of performance. John's parents removed him from public school,
enrolled him in a private facility, and sued for the expense,
claiming that the school had not complied with IEP requirements. The court did not agree with the parents because
of their involvement and requests in the IEP development.
Thus, in Doe v. Defendant I, an IEP without performance
levels and goals was ruled effective, since the procedural requirements had been followed, although not recorded in the
document. In W.G., a complete document had been created, but
without the participation of required team members. IEPs are
meant to be flexible, and the unique program of John Doe was

10. Jackson v. Franklin County Sch. Bd., 806 F.23 623 (5th Cir. 1986).
11. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist., 960 F.2d 1479 (9th
Cir. 1992).
12. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(20).
13. Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1990).
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within appropriate parameters. 14 The answer to the first
prong of the Rowley test, (have IDEA procedures been complied
with?) is "yes" in the case where all the formalities have been
observed but not recorded in the IEP, and "no" when important
substantive elements of the procedural requirements are omitted.

B.

Substantive Compliance

Even when procedural requirements of IDEA have been
complied with, an IEP which will enable the child to receive
educational benefits must also be created. The Court's holding
in Rowley that children with disabilities need only receive some
educational benefit, 15 raises the concern of fiscal abuses. This
concern is illustrated in G.D. v. Westmoreland. 16 The
Westmoreland School District declined to finance the placement
of an elementary school child with learning disabilities at a
private school, even though several professionals had recommended it. Citing Rowley and others, the court concluded that
any one F APE might not be the only choice, the choice of experts, the parent's choice, the first choice, or the best choice. A
placement which is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits, or meets other minimum statutory standards,
which the court ruled G.D.'s IEP did, is appropriate. 17 The
focus, implies the court, should be on appropriateness of placement and not alternatives preferred by the family.
However, in Polk v. Susquehanna/ 8 the court, also citing
Rowley, specifically held that IDEA calls for more than trivial
educational benefit. Christopher Polk had several severe developmental disabilities, and was not, as Amy Rowley, advancing
easily from grade to grade. This holding was derived from EHA
language (substantively unchanged in the IDEA) which requires States to establish a goal of "full educational opportunity"19 for children with disabilities. The court used this Ian-

14. !d.
15. See supra text accompanying note 4.
16. G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1991).
17. G.D., 930 F.2d at 948.
18. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
19. "[T]here is established [by the State receiving federal assistance] a goal of
providing full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1412 (2)(A).
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guage to conclude that Rowley should be viewed narrowly and
that meaningful benefit must result from a FAPE.
Unfortunately Rowley remains the only extensive Supreme
Court treatment of IDEA. As such, the simple requirement of
"some benefit" can be read as a relief from duty for educational
agencies. If a major purpose of the IDEA truly is providing an
appropriate education for disabled children, the Polk requirement of "meaningful benefit," while vague, is the more appropriate standard to be applied in determining if a F APE meets
the substantive requirements of the IDEA.
Ill.

COST

It is unquestioned that financing FAPEs for disabled children is very expensive. 20 To defray great costs, school districts
often request parental contributions or may eliminate programs
citing lack of funds.

A. Parental Contribution
When a child receives services with no educational purpose, parental contributions may be required. An example of
this limitation of the "without charge" clause comes from
Guempel v. State. 21 In Guempel, a young woman was placed
into a State-run residential facility. The court held that placement was not for educational purposes, but for provision of
basic life care. As such, her family could be required to contribute to incurred costs.
Similarly, federal regulations now state that fees incidental
to education, which would be required from children without
disabilities, are not waived because of disabilities. 22 However,
20. Nationally, special education costs exceed $30 billion to serve 5 million
students. Joseph P. Shapiro, Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RE·
PORT, Dec. 13, 1993 at 46.
21. Guempel v. State, 387 A.2d 399 (N.J. 1978), cert. granted 405 A.2d 824
(N.J. 1979), modified Lefme v. State Dept. of Institutions and Agencies, 418 A.2d
229 (N.J. 1980).
22. At no cost means that all specially designed instruction is provided
without charge, but does not preclude incidental fees which are normally charged to non-handicapped students or their parents as a part
of the regular education program.
34 C.F.R. § 300.14(b)(l) (1992).
The Guempel's would typically be expected to provide for their child's food,
clothing and shelter, and could therefore be expected to continue providing for such
care even though their daughter was living in a residential facility. Guempel at
408.
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the implication in Guempel is that were an IEP team to conclude that placement in a public or private residential facility
was the appropriate setting for educational purposes, the parents would be shielded from contribution. 23
B.

Availability of Funds

Hand in hand with the question of parental contribution
goes the problem of fund availability. This is treated in Mills v.
Board of Education. 24 A school district which, citing insufficient funds, had cut the educational benefits of "exceptional"
children was enjoined from the exclusion. In the decision, the
court held that:
[T]he District of Columbia's interest in educating the excluded
children clearly must outweigh its interest in preserving its
financial resources. If sufficient funds are not available to
finance all of the services and programs that are needed and
desirable in the system then the available funds must be
expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely
excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with
his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies
of the ... public school system whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot
be permitted to bear more heavily on the [disabled] child than
on [other children]. 25

There is to be no preference between children with, and children without, disabilities. Equitable distribution is the key.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Exactly what constitutes FAPE is not clearly defined. This
is actually advantageous. Disabilities themselves are not clearly defined, but are so varied that creative FAPEs should be
developed which serve the best interests of everyone, especially
a unique child with a unique disability. Creative solutions
might arise out of Title I of the Americans With Disabilities
Act (ADA) which applies to the interaction of employers and
employees or applicants. The ADA allows employers and their
employees with disabilities to bargain over what reasonable
accommodations will be made for the disability. If an employer
23. See Guempel at 410.
24. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
25. ld. at 876.
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cannot afford a specific accommodation, it is appropriate for the
employee to contribute to the amount the employer is willing to
offer. It follows that children with disabilities, when confronted
with the issue of insufficient public funds, would be able to
contribute the difference the educational agency was truly and
equitably unable to provide.
A practical example of this might be a child with a muscular disability who needs special equipment to write assignments and take notes. Using Title I as a model, the school/child
interaction could proceed as follows. At the IEP meeting, the
school representative would make clear that the school has the
responsibility to make reasonable accommodations for known
disabilities of otherwise qualified students. The burden would
shift to the child or parent to explain the problems associated
with the disability and request special equipment. Although the
school has the responsibility to provide reasonable accommodations, it is foreseeable that school and child wishes might not
coincide, particularly if appropriate equipment is expensive.
Mter a period of good faith bargaining, the parties could decide
that the school can contribute only so much without undue
hardship. At this point the child should have the opportunity to
make up the difference in cost between what the school is able
to offer and the accommodation the child would like to receive.
Both parents and educational agencies have constraints
which influence their actions. The main concern of parents of
an exceptional child is the child's life. Educational agencies
have a derivative concern, that of the child's education. In light
of this common concern, if parents and schools will appreciate
the constraints under which the other operates, and work together as partners to overcome disabilities, free, appropriate
educations will be provided, and children will be best served.

Martin W. Bates
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